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  Abstract 
Using the example of Switzerland, this paper examines the extent to which the state and the 
social security institutions change the income distribution. Two sets of questions are 
examined: (1) Who benefits from the public services, and who bears the public costs? (2) To 
what extent does an annual redistribution involve redistribution (a) across households with 
different lifetime income, and (b) across different phases of life within the same households? 
Budget incidence analyses and pseudo panel procedures allow to compare annual and 
lifetime household incomes that arise before and after transfers. The results suggest that 
public interventions induce substantial redistribution, which is due primarily, however, to 
income-smoothing transfers within households and not to redistribution across households. 
 
Keywords 




D31, D91, H22 
 1 Introduction
Over the last few years, the Swiss national budget has steadily increased. In 1990, the
expenditures of the state and social security institutions absorbed 40 percent of Switzerland’s
gross domestic product (GDP); by 2005, this share had risen to 51 percent (compare Table
1). This upsurge can certainly be traced to the slowdown of economic growth. However, it
also mirrors the continuous expansion of state activities. The growth of social security and
social assistance beneﬁts has been particularly dynamic, but the costs of other sectors, such
as higher education (+78.6 percent), public transport (+61.2 percent), and health services
(+46.6 percent), have risen substantially as well. Against this background, questions arise as
to who beneﬁts from the expanding public services and who bears the costs. These questions
suggest the more basic question concerning welfare distribution in a state and the overall
redistribution that is brought about by public interventions.
In recent years, several analyses have addressed the issue of income distribution and redis-
tribution in Switzerland (Economiesuisse, 2007; Künzi and Schärrer, 2004; Ecoplan,
2004; Suter and Mathey, 2000). These studies focus on monetary transfers and produced
results that are in line with the international literature (for an overview, see Atkinson et al.,
1995). Taxes, social security contributions, and social beneﬁts reduce income inequalities as
they induce redistribution from high-income to low-income segments of the population.
However, despite the consistent picture that emerges from these analyses, they all have
a serious shortcoming: They are limited to monetary and annual transfers. This comes with
two important disadvantages. First, real, or in-kind public transfers, such as free education,
subsidized health services, and the availability of infrastructure facilities, are ignored and
with them a major part of the redistributive volume – real transfers amount to half of the
total public spending (see Table 1). An evaluation of the redistributive impact of the state
is incomplete without assessing the ways that nonmonetary transfers beneﬁt the diﬀerent
segments of the population.
Second, the exclusive consideration of annual transfers prohibits the consideration of two
separate, but conceptually diﬀerent, redistributive mechanisms. One is the inter-household
redistribution across households that have diﬀerent income levels over the long run. The
other mechanism is the intra-household redistribution of income across diﬀerent phases of
life within one household. While the inter-household redistribution aims at a convergence of
lifetime income across households, the objective of the intra-household redistribution is to
smooth the income over the life cycle. Such smoothing is achieved by shifting the income
from one stage of life to the next, primarily from the working stage to the retirement stage.
Not distinguishing between these two mechanisms risks overestimating the redistribution
across households.
2This analysis focuses on these analytical shortcomings and examines the redistributive
impact of the state, inclusive of social insurance at the level of individual households. Two
sets of questions are examined:
1. What are the redistributive eﬀects of the entire state as well as of individual revenues
and expenditures? Who, over the course of a year, beneﬁts from monetary and real
public payments and services, and who bears the direct and indirect public costs? And
who are the net beneﬁciaries?
2. To what extent does an annual redistribution involve (a) redistribution across house-
holds with diﬀerent lifetime or long-term income, and (b) redistribution across diﬀerent
phases of life within the same households in order to smooth lifetime income?
Whereas the ﬁrst set of questions is connected to the ﬁrst redistribution analysis con-
ducted for Switzerland, undertaken by Leu et al. (1988), and aims to update and expand
upon those results, the second question addresses a ﬁeld of research that has been widely
neglected in Swiss as well as international literature. The methodological approach is thus
twofold. The ﬁrst step consists of conventional analysis of the annual budget incidence for
the years 1990, 1998, and 2000 to 2005. Secondly, these annual analyses are used to generate
a pseudo panel on the basis of which the course of lifetime income before and after public
transfers can be constructed. A decomposable inequality measure allows for the separation of
inter-household income redistribution from intra-household income shifts over the life cycle.
The results show that the state has a substantial redistributive impact. This impact stems
mainly from the public expenditure side, which considerably reduces the income diﬀerences
in the population. Unlike the implications of short-term eﬀects, however, the convergence
of income is not due primarily to the social balancing across households but to the state-
prescribed transfers of income across the diﬀerent stages of life. Income peaks during the
working years are broken markedly by an enhanced contribution burden during that period.
In return, household income is prevented from declining not only after retirement, but also
in times when the labor market or health-related or family-related issues disrupt earning
capacity. As a consequence, the variance in lifetime income is clearly reduced.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the methodological basis,
especially the concept of budget incidence analysis, the generation of the pseudo panel using
the available data, and the quantiﬁcation of the inter- and intra-household redistribution
via decomposable inequality measures. Section 3 presents the results from an annual and
long-term perspective. Section 4 provides guidelines for cautious interpretation. Section 5
summarizes and concludes.
3Table 1: Consolidated budget of the confederation, cantons, municipalities, and social insurance institutions, 1990, 2000, 2005
EXPENDITURES (prices 2005) in bn CHF change REVENUES (prices 2005) in bn CHF change
1990 2000 2005 1990-2005 1990 2000 2005 1990-2005
General administration 7.6 8.2 9.0 18.2% Taxes on income and property 54.9 64.4 67.5 22.9%
Justice, police, ﬁre brigade 6.2 7.1 8.1 30.0% Income and property taxes 37.5 43.0 48.4 28.8%
National defence 8.4 5.6 4.9 -41.7% Earnings and capital taxes (corporate taxes) 9.4 13.0 12.8 35.8%
International aﬀairs 2.0 2.4 2.4 22.5% Withhold. tax, stamp duty (excl. foreign contr.) 3.9 5.6 3.5 -9.9%
Regional and district planning 2.0 2.1 2.1 7.7% Real estate taxes 4.1 2.8 2.9 -30.2%
Environment 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.7% Taxes on property: Tax on motor vehicles 1.5 1.7 1.9 29.5%
Education 21.1 23.8 27.4 30.2% Excise duties 17.6 24.6 25.5 44.6%
State schools, primary education 10.8 12.2 13.7 26.5% Value-added tax 12.5 17.3 18.1 45.2%
General education schools, vocational training 6.5 6.6 7.0 8.1% Mineral oil and fuel taxes 3.9 5.5 5.3 36.4%
University-level institutions 3.8 5.0 6.7 78.6% Tax on tobacco products 1.2 1.7 2.1 64.2%
Culture and recreation 3.9 4.0 4.2 7.4% Vehicle taxes (heavy traﬃc, nat. routes) 0.4 0.7 1.5 271.8%
Health 13.5 16.3 19.8 46.6% Customs duties 1.5 1.1 1.0 -35.8%
Transport 11.6 13.6 14.8 28.0% Royalties and concessions 1.1 1.8 1.3 15.6%
Road traﬃc 6.8 6.9 7.1 4.6% Other taxes 2.0 1.6 1.6 -16.3%
Public transport 4.8 6.7 7.7 61.2% Remunerations 16.2 21.9 25.0 54.0%
Subsidies 6.5 7.1 6.2 -5.1% Financial and investment income 6.0 14.2 13.1 117.5%
Agriculture 4.0 4.4 4.2 4.7% Payments-in to SI (insurants & employers) 69.2 83.6 94.0 35.9%
Others 2.5 2.7 2.0 -21.0% Old-age/invalidity insurance (AHV/IV), EO 24.4 25.7 28.0 14.8%
Payments-out of social insurance (SI) 69.7 100.8 114.1 63.6% Occupational pension plans (BVG) 27.7 30.8 35.8 29.3%
Old-age insurance (AHV) 24.5 30.3 32.9 34.1% Mandatory health insurance 8.4 11.3 15.3 82.2%
Pension plans (BVG; incl. pre-retirem. beneﬁts) 14.4 26.3 28.2 96.4% ALV (excl. refunding to border crossers) 0.8 6.5 4.3 430.2%
Disability insurance (IV) 5.4 9.6 12.3 127.0% Family and child allowances 3.7 4.5 4.8 29.4%
Mandat. health ins. (incl. premium reductions) 9.4 13.8 17.4 84.6% Accident insurance (UVG) 4.2 4.9 5.8 38.3%
Unemployment insurance (ALV) 0.5 2.9 5.8 1040.5% Capital and other revenues of SI 16.5 20.4 17.7 6.8%
Family and child allowances 3.7 4.4 4.7 27.3% Occupational beneﬁt institutions 13.9 17.3 14.9 7.6%
Accident insurance (UVG) 3.5 4.1 4.7 35.0% Other SI 2.7 3.1 2.7 2.6%
Income compensations (EO) 1.1 0.7 0.8 -25.2%
Other expenditures 7.2 8.8 7.2 0.4%
Other social welfare 5.3 8.2 9.3 73.4%
Social assistance 2.6 5.5 6.0 130.9%
Other beneﬁts of social welfare 2.7 2.8 3.3 18.8%
Finance, debt service 6.9 11.3 9.5 38.3%
Total expenditures state and SI 167.6 213.5 234.8 40.1% Total revenues state and SI 187.0 236.0 250.1 33.7%
In % of GDP 40.1% 48.5% 50.7% In % of GDP 44.7% 53.6% 54.0%
Surplus revenue state and SI 19.4 22.5 15.3
due to state budget -8.3 3.0 -1.8
due to SI budget 27.2 20.0 17.5
Note: Revenues exceed expenditures in the consolidated budget of state and social insurance because the latter records a surplus revenue. The reason for this lies primarily in the second pillar of the old-age provision
system (occupational pension plans, BVG), which is still in the expansion phase and, therefore, pre-ﬁnances future beneﬁts to a higher degree than it pays out in current pensions. Considering the budget without
social insurance shows familiar deﬁcits for the years 1990 and 2005 (see the lower three rows in the right side of the table). Abbreviations: SI – social insurance; AHV – Alters-und Hinterlassenenversicherung,
old-age and survivors’ insurance; ALV – Arbeitslosenversicherung, unemployment insurance; BVG – Berufsvorsorge(gesetz), occupational old-age insurance, i.e. pension plans; EO – Erwerbsersatz(ordnung),
income compensations; IV – Invalidenversicherung, disability insurance; UVG –Unfallversicherung, accident insurance. The category ’other taxes’ includes inheritance and gift taxes, incentive taxes, beer taxes,
lottery taxes, and other property and excise taxes. Sources: Public ﬁnance ﬁgures (Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung EFV, 1990-2005), Swiss Social Insurance Statistics (Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen BSV,
1990-2005)
42 Methodological Approach and Data
2.1 The Concept of Budget Incidence Analysis
This paper studies redistribution on the basis of budget (or ﬁscal) incidence analysis. There-
fore, ﬁrst, the pre-ﬁsc income before transfers, i.e., the income that would exist if there were
no state and social insurance institutions, is determined for each household. In a second
step, the households’ post-ﬁsc income is calculated, which is the income that results after
taxes and social security contributions (negative transfers), and after the receipt of public
services and beneﬁts (positive transfers). The diﬀerence between pre- and post-ﬁsc income,
i.e. economic situation before and after the allocation of (all or individual) public expenses
and revenues allows an estimation of the extent of the (total or intervention-speciﬁc) income
redistribution.
In this analysis, pre-ﬁsc income is deﬁned as the sum of earned income, capital income,
and private transfers before taxes and social security contributions. For homeowners, an
imputed rent of the property is added in order to better assess their economic strength com-
pared to that of tenant households. Included as well are implicit taxes that other tax debtors
roll oﬀ and that lower household income compared to a situation without state intervention.
Ranked among such implicit charges are employers’ contributions to the social security sys-
tem that are basically wage components. Depending on the incidence assumptions (see
below), corporate taxes are also borne indirectly by private households: If companies dis-
tribute proﬁts after taxes, their tax burden eventually falls on wealthy households whose
proﬁts per share are diminished.
The computation of post-ﬁsc income involves two steps. The ﬁrst step is to determine the
total size of each transfer category. For this, the annual governmental ﬁnancial statements
(including social insurance institutions, see Table 1) are referenced: The size of the negative
and positive transfer categories follow from the positions on the revenue and expenditure
sides, respectively. In the second step, the transfer totals are allocated to individual house-
holds. The negative transfers are assigned according to the contribution burden borne by
the households, and the positive transfers are allocated according to the beneﬁts received by
the households. In the case of nonmonetary public services, households are assigned shares
of the provision costs according to their service utilization. These shares approximate the
amount that the income of the households would have to rise if they had to pay for the
public services accessed.1
1More convincing from a theoretical point of view would be the allocation of public services according
to a household’s willingness to pay and the utility derived from the consumption of the services. However,
households do not have to reveal such willingness for publicly provided goods (i.e., no price formation takes
place).
5Formally, the estimation of post-ﬁsc income involves













whereby Yh is household income, Si denotes the total transfer size of public service i, and
Cj the total transfer size of public charge j. U represents utilization and B represents
burden. The public services and goods allocated to a household thus depend on its individual
utilization (e.g., the number of school days that are provided to its children) compared to the
aggregated utilization of the total population (e.g., the total number of school days provided).
Accordingly, the charges assigned correspond to the individual burden of a household (e.g.,
its individual income tax obligation) as compared to the statewide burden (total public
revenues from income taxes).
A crucial aspect of budget incidence analyses are the assumptions necessary to allocate
the public revenues and expenditures to the individual households. The problem is that
only personal taxes, social security contributions, and monetary beneﬁts are directly evident
from available data. In contrast, burdens of implicit taxes as well as beneﬁts drawn from
in-kind public services must be estimated. This eﬀort requires assumptions as to who,
independent of formal tax liability, ultimately ﬁnances the state budget, and for whom
public services eﬀectively prove advantageous. As far as possible, this analysis adopts the
incidence assumptions that are generally accepted in the literature (see Boadway and Keen,
2000; Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002; Ruggeri, 2003). Table 2 shows the standard
allocation rules that follow from these assumptions, as well as alternative progressive and
regressive scenarios for cases that elicit diﬀerent views. Detailed explanations are given in
the Appendix.
2.2 Data
The ﬁrst database for this study comprises the ﬁnancial statements of the confederation, the
cantons, the municipalities and social insurance institutions; these statements are consoli-
dated to obtain the overall national budget shown in Table 1. The (consolidated) data for
the regional corporate bodies are obtained from the Swiss Federal Finance Administration,
and those for the social security institutions come from the Federal Social Insurance Oﬃce.2
The calculation of the pre- and post-ﬁsc household income calls for detailed information
about income and expenses, as well as demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, such
as age, gender, education, occupation, and employment status, of each household. This in-
formation can be extracted from the Survey of Income and Expenditure (SIE; Einkommens-
und Verbrauchserhebung), which the Federal Statistical Oﬃce conducts yearly and is based
2To break down the health sector costs into age- and gender-speciﬁc outlays, hospital surveys conducted
by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce are additionally used.
6Table 2: Criteria for the allocation of public revenues and expenditures
Standard scenario Progressive Regressive
Taxes on income and property
Income and property taxes Paid income and property taxes
Earnings and capital taxes 50% capital inc./ 50% consumption exp. Capital income Consump. exp.
Withholding tax, stamp duty Capital income
Real estate taxes 50% real estate taxes/ 50% rent exp. Real estate taxes
Property taxes: Tax on motor vehicles Paid taxes on motor vehicles
Excise duties
Value-added tax Total consumption expenses Earned&SI income
Fuel tax Expenses for fuel Earned&SI income
Tax on tobacco products Expenses for tobacco products Earned&SI income
Vehicle taxes (heavy traﬃc, nat. routes) Total consumption expenses Earned&SI income
Customs duties Total consumption expenses Earned&SI income
Royalties and concessions Total consumption expenses Earned&SI income
Other taxes Total income
Remunerations 50% total income/ 50% household size Total income Household size
Payments-in SI (insurants & employers)
Old-age/invalidty insurance (AHV/IV), EO Employees’ AHV/IV/EO contributions
Occupational pension plans (BVG) Employees’ BVG contributions
Health insurance, mandatory part Health ins. rate minus rate reductions
Unemployment insurance (ALV) Employees’ ALV contributions
Family and child allowances Employees’ ALV contributions
Accident insurance (UVG) Employees’ UVG contributions
Capital and other revenues of SI
Occupational beneﬁt institutions Employees’ BVG contributions
Other SI Allocated SI contributions
Financial and investment income Allocated other taxes and charges
General administration 50% total income/ 50% household size Household size Total income
Justice, police, ﬁre brigade 50% total income/ 50% household size Household size Total income
National defence 50% total income/ 50% household size Household size Total income
International aﬀairs 50% total income/ 50% household size Household size Total income
Regional and district planning 50% total income/ 50% household size Household size Total income
Environment 50% total income/ 50% household size Household size Total income
Education
State schools, primary education No. of school children
General education schools, vocational training No. of persons in secondary education
University-level institutions No. of persons in tertiary education
Culture and recreation Exp. for entertainm./recreation/culture
Health Age- and gender-speciﬁc hhd. proﬁle
Transport
Road traﬃc Expenses for fuel
Public transport Expenses for public transportation
Subsidies
Agriculture Income from agriculture
Others Total consumption expenses
Payments-out of social insurance (SI)
Old-age insurance (AHV) Received AHV beneﬁts
Occupational pension plans (BVG) Received BVG beneﬁts
Disability insurance (IV) Received IV beneﬁts
Health insurance, mandatory part Received health insurance beneﬁts
Unemployment insurance (ALV) Received ALV beneﬁts
Family and child allowances Received family allowances
Accident insurance (UVG) Age- and gender-speciﬁc hhd. proﬁle
Income compensations (EO) No. of men in military/civil service age
Other expenditures Received social beneﬁts
Other social welfare
Social assistance Received social assistance
Other beneﬁts of social welfare Received social asst./beneﬁts ex BVG
Finance, debt service Allocated public exp. and social beneﬁts Capital income
Note: ALV – unemployment insurance; AHV – old-age and survivors’ insurance; BVG – occupational old-age insurance; EO
– income compensations; IV – disability insurance; SI – social insurance institutions; UVG – accident insurance. The public
expenditure category ‘Health’ contains subsidies to the health sector (e.g., the ﬁnancing of the medical infrastructure), whereas
the category ‘Health insurance’ includes insurance beneﬁts in the case of damage.
7on 3000 to 4000 voluntarily participating households. These data contain necessary infor-
mation both to calculate the pre-ﬁsc income and to assign public revenues and expenditures
according to the aforementioned allocation rules.3 This study uses the annual SIE survey
data collected between 2000 to 2005, as well as data from two earlier surveys conducted in
1990 and 1998.
2.3 Rationale and Construction of the Pseudo Panel
Similar to previous budget incidence analyses, this work ﬁrst computes pre- and post-ﬁsc
household income on an annual basis. For an appropriate picture of the public redistribution,
however, these snapshots must be supplemented by a comparison of long-term income before
and after transfers. This requires information on the yearly income of individual households
for a long period of time, ideally for a whole life cycle.
Because such panel data, as in most redistribution analyses (see Björklund and Palme
(2002) for an exception), is not available, this paper uses the method of pseudo panel con-
struction, developed by Deaton (1985) and Browning et al. (1985), to conduct the lon-
gitudinal analysis. The idea is that in a series of cross-sectional data, although a household
cannot be followed up over time, a cohort, i.e., a clearly distinguishable population segment,
such as persons born in the same year, can be tracked. If annual surveys are carried out
with a representative selection of the population, the average behavior of a cohort in one
period can be related to its average behavior in the next period. Thus, instead of tracking
individual households over time, cohorts are observed over time. Given that cohorts are
big enough (more than 100 individuals per cohort; see Verbeek and Nijman, 1992), the
cohorts’ means form a data panel that represents the behavior of the underlying households.
The present work adopts this procedure for the available cross-sectional data sets. In each
survey, households are allocated to one of nine cohorts according to the year of birth of the
household head (-1934, 1935-1939, 1940-44, ..., 1970-74). The average pre-ﬁsc and post-ﬁsc
income per cohort is then combined into a pseudo panel (see Table 9 in the Appendix), which
has two uses: First, the pseudo panel serves to simulate a representative life cycle of income
before and after transfers. Secondly, as discussed in the next section, it allows an estimation
of the shares of inter- and intra-household income redistribution in total redistribution.
3Speciﬁcally, for each category of public revenues and expenditures, ﬁrst, each household’s share in the
total of the respective allocation criteria is calculated. In the case of primary education, for instance, each
household’s share in the total (SIE) population of schoolchildren is computed. In this way, distribution keys
for all revenue- and expenditure-side transfers are generated, which, in the second step, serve to allocate the
state budget (scaled down to the SIE sample size) to individual households.
82.4 Measurement of Redistribution
In order to capture the comparisons of the pre- and post-ﬁsc income distributions quanti-
tatively, it is useful to express a given income distribution through a single measure. This
task is performed by an inequality measure, which increases in value when a monetary unit
ﬂows from a poor household to a rich household. For the purpose of this analysis, a de-
composable measure is chosen whereby total inequality in the population can be divided
into the inequalities within individual, mutually exclusive groups and into the inequalities












where yi is the income of household i, n the number of households, and µ the average income.
The parameter α determines if the inequality measure reacts more strongly to inequalities in
the upper (α > 0) or lower (α < 0) income segments. α thus indicates the degree of poverty
aversion.





















where k is an index for K mutually exclusive groups, nk denotes the number of households
in group k, and µk is the average income in group k. Consequently, nkµk/nµ is the income
share of group k in total income, and nk/n its share in total population. Ik
α denotes the gen-
eralized entropy measure within group k, IW
α is the weighted average of these group-internal
inequality values (within group inequality), and IB
α is the generalized entropy measure of the
distribution of the group means µk (between group inequality).
The decomposition of the inequality measure is used to separate the inter-household from
the intra-household redistribution. To this end, total inequality Iα is calculated for the pooled
sample (all households in all cross-sectional data sets) before and after transfers (i.e., Iα,pre-fisc
and Iα,post-fisc). Then, the cohorts described in the previous section are taken as the mutually
exclusive groups. The inequality between these cohorts, IB
α , is the inequality of the average
income that was earned within the individual cohorts from 1990 to 2005. The comparison
of the IB
α before and after transfers shows which portion of the total redistribution is due to
redistribution across cohorts. This comparison indicates the redistribution across households
with diﬀerent long-term income. The residual Iα−IB
α = IW
α shows the inequality within the
individual cohorts and represents the income variations over time. The comparison of IW
α
before and after transfers indicates which shares of the total redistribution are household-
internal income shifts across the diﬀerent stages of life.
93 Results
3.1 Redistribution within a Year: General Overview
Table 3 compares key ﬁgures of pre- and post-ﬁsc income distributions.4 It follows that
the Swiss state produces considerable redistribution and, in so doing, substantially reduces
income inequalities. Through the transfers, the income variance decreases by two-thirds.
The smaller diﬀerence between the ﬁrst quintile and the mean indicates that the transfers
lessen the right skewness of the income distribution, i.e., the concentration on relatively low
income. From the breakdown of income by pre-ﬁsc income deciles, it can be seen that public
interventions reduce the income of the upper six deciles, whereas they enhance the income
in the lower four deciles. For example, households in the ﬁfth decile with a mean pre-ﬁsc
income of 57’900 francs lose 5’400 francs on average, whereas those in the tenth decile forfeit
80’200 francs of their pre-ﬁsc income of 182’000 francs. On the side of the net beneﬁciaries,
on the other hand, the lowest decile gains the most from the state; on average, it receives
67’500 francs.
Table 3: Key ﬁgures of pre- and post-ﬁsc income distributions, 2005




First quintile 20’786 44’194
Average income per
pre-ﬁsc decile
1 2’500 70’000 67’500
2 13’400 72’500 59’100
3 30’000 61’500 31’500
4 45’800 54’900 9’100
5 57’900 52’500 -5’400
6 68’600 54’900 -13’700
7 80’500 57’600 -22’900
8 93’700 64’600 -29’100
9 113’900 68’000 -45’900
10 182’000 101’800 -80’200
Note: The reduction of mean income through transfers is due to the fact that the consolidated state and social insurance budget
is allocated to households. As mentioned, the social insurance sector accounts for a surplus revenue because of the occupational
pension system that is still in the expansion phase. Consequently, more public revenues than expenditures are assigned to
households, thus leading to a negative average net transfer.
4The results are reported as income per adult equivalent throughout the paper, meaning that household
income is divided by the sum of adult equivalents per household. Following the OECD equivalent scale,
household heads are weighted as 1, household members above the age of 15 as 0.5, and children as 0.3.
10Figure 1 illustrates the redistribution by means of Lorenz curves. The solid curves repre-
sent the ordinary Lorenz curves before and after transfers and show the income shares that
fall to diﬀerent population shares. The 45 degree line serves as a reference and represents the
equal distribution of income. Due to the transfers, the Lorenz curve moves closer to the 45
degree line, which points out the reduction in income inequalities. For instance, in the ab-
sence of state interventions, the 20 percent poorest households together would receive barely
3 percent of the total income, whereas the 20 percent poorest households in the present
situation actually receive 12 percent of the total income.
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Note: The pre-ﬁsc and post-ﬁsc Lorenz curves show, respectively, which proportions of the (pre-ﬁsc or post-ﬁsc) income fall
upon diﬀerent households shares for households that are ordered according to pre-ﬁsc and post-ﬁsc income. The modiﬁed Lorenz
curve maintains the order of the households according to pre-ﬁsc income and shows which proportion of post-ﬁsc income falls
upon the households.
Particularly interesting is the ‘modiﬁed’ Lorenz curve. It shows the proportion of total
post-ﬁsc income that falls upon the households, which are ordered by increasing pre-ﬁsc
income (as opposed to increasing post-ﬁsc income, as is the case of the ordinary post-ﬁsc
Lorenz curve). The modiﬁed Lorenz curve indicates that the poorest 40 percent of house-
holds, as measured by pre-ﬁsc income, receive only about 13 percent of the total income
before transfers, but 40 percent of the total income after transfers. This distribution sug-
gests that for low-income groups, state interventions even lead to an elimination of income
inequalities.
113.2 Incidence of Individual Public Interventions
Table 4 shows, per income quintile, the beneﬁts and burdens that accrue to an average
household from the public expenditures and revenues, respectively. If the expenditure side
and the absolute values are considered ﬁrst, it is seen (upper left part of Table 4) that
public spending favors households with the lowest pre-ﬁsc income most and decreases this
favoritism with increasing income. The combined beneﬁts for the ﬁrst quintile sum up to
88’000 francs on average and are thus almost twice as high as the beneﬁts to the average
household. The beneﬁts for the second quintile with 51’960 francs are still 12 percent above
the average. The households in the third to ﬁfth quintiles each receive about 30’000 francs
from public expenditures, which is about one-third below the average gain.
The breakdown of expenditures into individual parts shows that the provision of general
public goods, the expenditures for individual and for public transport, as well as subsidiza-
tion of culture resources, reaches high-income households to a greater extent than it reaches
low-income households. In the case of public goods, this ﬁnding expresses the assump-
tion of the standard incidence scenario, wherein households with high income and wealth
beneﬁt more from a favorable (business) environment created, for example, by an eﬃcient
public administration, a functioning legal system, or good foreign relations. In the case
of transportation infrastructure and cultural subsidies, well-oﬀ households proﬁt more than
low-income households because they are better able to aﬀord the private outlays necessary
to make use of the public services.
In contrast, public spending for the health sector as well as for social security transfers is
concentrated in low-income households. As indicated by the beneﬁts of the old-age provisions
(AHV and BVG), the state eﬀectively protects income during times when earning ability is
no longer feasible. In the ﬁrst quintile, which consists mainly of retired households, old-age
beneﬁts boost income by almost 45’000 francs. In the second quintile, the remittances still
amount to 13’000 francs and can be traced back largely to partly retired households. For
the upper income quintiles, which contain only a few pensioner households, the AHV and
BVG beneﬁts are small and explained mainly by widows’ pensions, children’s allowances, and
disability beneﬁts from occupational pension plans. In the case of public health expenditures,
the relatively high support of the ﬁrst quintile reﬂects the higher utilization of health care
services by the elderly.
The other social security transfers also tend to beneﬁt the lowest two quintiles, but
reach the middle- and high-income groups as well. This ﬁnding reﬂects compensations for
temporary disruptions in the ability to work, such as illness, unemployment, or maternity.
Finally, expenditures to service the public debt appear in favor of the low-income groups.
This ﬁnding is in accordance with the incidence assumption that groups who receive most
from the state are also those who contribute most to the spending deﬁcit.
12Table 4: Incidence of public expenditures and revenues by quintile of pre-ﬁsc household income, 2005
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Mean
per adult equivalent, in CHF in % of pre-ﬁsc income
PRE-FISC INCOME 7’940 37’880 63’220 87’090 147’930 68’790 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
PUBLIC SPENDING 88’000 51’960 32’160 29’610 30’690 46’490 1108.3 137.2 50.9 34.0 20.7 67.6
Public goods 4’320 5’030 5’490 5’970 7’860 5’730 54.4 13.3 8.7 6.9 5.3 8.3
Education 2’100 7’460 6’570 5’510 3’310 4’990 26.4 19.7 10.4 6.3 2.2 7.3
Culture 600 620 740 980 1’370 860 7.6 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.3
Health 6’390 3’710 2’920 2’740 2’930 3’740 80.4 9.8 4.6 3.1 2.0 5.4
Transport 2’210 2’280 2’810 3’060 4’370 2’950 27.9 6.0 4.5 3.5 3.0 4.3
Subsidies 560 2’380 950 420 970 1’050 7.0 6.3 1.5 0.5 0.7 1.5
Old-age insurance (AHV) beneﬁts 24’750 5’890 900 710 1’140 6’680 311.7 15.6 1.4 0.8 0.8 9.7
Pension plan beneﬁts (BVG) 19’940 7’600 1’440 1’420 1’090 6’300 251.1 20.1 2.3 1.6 0.7 9.2
Disability insurance (IV) beneﬁts 4’670 4’410 1’890 1’170 540 2’540 58.8 11.6 3.0 1.3 0.4 3.7
Health insurance beneﬁts 3’750 3’390 3’190 3’260 3’300 3’380 47.3 9.0 5.0 3.7 2.2 4.9
Other social insurance beneﬁts 9’930 6’080 3’880 2’870 2’530 5’060 125.0 16.0 6.1 3.3 1.7 7.4
Social assistance 6’990 1’780 310 460 150 1’940 88.0 4.7 0.5 0.5 0.1 2.8
Debt service 3’570 2’110 1’300 1’200 1’250 1’890 45.0 5.6 2.1 1.4 0.8 2.7
in % of pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts (real and monetary)
PUBLIC REVENUES 24’720 31’660 41’670 55’600 93’740 49’460 25.8 35.2 43.7 47.6 52.5 42.9
Income and property taxes 6’460 5’570 6’110 9’280 20’710 9’620 6.7 6.2 6.4 8.0 11.6 8.3
Earnings and capital taxes 2’010 2’370 1’700 2’040 4’710 2’560 2.1 2.6 1.8 1.7 2.6 2.2
Excise duties 4’020 3’980 4’660 5’440 7’250 5’070 4.2 4.4 4.9 4.7 4.1 4.4
Other taxes 2’290 2’340 2’110 2’560 4’460 2’750 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.4
Remunerations 3’680 4’280 4’670 5’090 6’690 4’880 3.8 4.8 4.9 4.4 3.7 4.2
Public investments 1’930 1’940 2’010 2’550 4’570 2’600 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.3
Contributions to AHV and IV 810 3’050 5’290 7’030 11’020 5’440 0.8 3.4 5.5 6.0 6.2 4.7
Contributions to pension plans 70 2’510 6’170 9’710 17’300 7’150 0.1 2.8 6.5 8.3 9.7 6.2
Contributions to health insurance 3’170 2’820 2’870 2’980 3’050 2’980 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.6 1.7 2.6
Contributions to other social insurance 130 1’470 3’010 4’180 5’680 2’890 0.1 1.6 3.2 3.6 3.2 2.5
Capital income of social insurance 150 1’330 3’070 4’750 8’290 3’520 0.2 1.5 3.2 4.1 4.6 3.1
Note: The allocation of public expenditures and revenues to households is based on the incidence assumptions of the standard scenario deﬁned in Table 2. Q1 to Q5 denote the quintiles of the pre-ﬁsc household
income distribution. The expenditure category ‘public goods’ combines the subcategories of general administration, justice, police, national defence, international aﬀairs, regional planning, and environment. ‘Other
social insurance’ includes unemployment insurance, family and child allowances, accident insurance and income compensation. ‘Excise duties’ includes value-added taxes, mineral oil and fuel taxes, and taxes on
tobacco products. The category ‘other taxes’ includes withholding taxes, stamp duties, real estate taxes, taxes on motor vehicles, customs duties, royalties and concessions, inheritance and gift taxes, incentive taxes,
and other property and excise taxes.
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3On the public revenue side, payments to the state increase with income (lower left part
of Table 4). Whereas the representative household of the ﬁrst quintile with 24’720 francs
contributes only half as much as the average household, the household in the ﬁfth quintile
with 93’740 pays 1.9 times as much. This inequality in the burden is still more pronounced
for social security contributions from which the (often retired) households in the ﬁrst quintile
are practically exempt. Only health insurance premiums are on a similar level of about 3’000
francs in all income categories.
The situation is diﬀerent for taxes. The ﬁrst quintile does not bear the least burden;
instead, it is the second or third quintile. The reason for this situation lies again in the fact
that the ﬁrst quintile contains mainly households whose income is derived primarily from
social transfers. Because such income is taxable, the income taxes are relatively high in
comparison to the pre-ﬁsc income. Moreover, for the often wealthy pensioner households,
property taxes, as well as the earnings and capital tax of the business sector, carry weight,
half of which is shifted to the capital owners in the standard scenario.
3.3 Vertical Redistribution: Relative Incidence of Public Interven-
tions
Having analyzed the incidences in absolute values, the question remains as to the conclu-
sions that can be drawn with regard to the redistributive eﬀects. Top-down or progressive
redistribution takes place when the ﬁnancially weak improve their position vis-a-vis the ﬁ-
nancially strong. On the expenditure side, this means that poor households must receive
more beneﬁts relative to their pre-ﬁsc income. If low-income households receive smaller ben-
eﬁts in absolute terms, a public intervention can thus still work progressively as long as the
poor receive more beneﬁts relative to their pre-ﬁsc income. On the side of public revenues,
a contribution is progressive if poor households pay less than rich ones, not only in absolute
terms but also in relation to pre-ﬁsc income.
The upper right part of Table 4 shows the public expenditures per household in terms of
percentage of the pre-ﬁsc income for each quintile. The table shows that the lowest income
quintile receives public beneﬁts that, on average, multiply the pre-ﬁsc income by a factor
of eleven. Meanwhile, the topmost quintile at the other end of the spectrum increases its
income by just 20.7 percent. As indicated by the detailed ﬁgures, the social beneﬁts work
progressively, and, to a lesser extent, the rest of the public spending does, too. Although well-
oﬀ households in part receive more in francs, they beneﬁt less than low-income households
in terms of the proportion of their pre-ﬁsc income. For example, cultural subsidies, where
the absolute values are the most widespread, household income increases by 7.6 percent in
the ﬁrst quintile, but only by 0.9 percent in the ﬁfth quintile.
14In the lower right part of Table 4, household contribution burdens are related to the
household’s economic strength. Note that, deviating from the public expenditure side, pre-
ﬁsc income plus real and monetary beneﬁts received from the state are used as the reference
base. This approach takes into account that the tax requirements depend on the economic
capacity after the receipt of the positive transfers. With this broader reference base, the
contribution system as a whole shows to be progressive. The ﬁrst income quintile with an
average contribution rate of 25.8 percent pays half as much as the highest quintile. If only
taxes are considered, the detailed ﬁgures reveal that, at best, income and property taxes have
a progressive eﬀect, however. There, the lower three quintiles remit taxes in the amount of
6 to 7 percent of the sum of the pre-ﬁsc income and beneﬁts, whereas the fourth and ﬁfth
quintiles pay 8.0 and 11.6 percent, respectively. The other taxes do not show a lower charge
for the less well-oﬀ households; their eﬀect is rather neutral to regressive. In contrast, the
social contributions, apart from health insurance, appear to have a progressive eﬀect.
These ﬁndings are largely conﬁrmed when examined for their statistical signiﬁcance.
This paper uses a nonparametric bootstrap procedure to test ∆Iα = Iα,pre-fisc − Iα,post-fisc,
as deﬁned in Section 2.4, for a signiﬁcant deviance from zero. The results (see Table 8 in
the Appendix) conﬁrm the impression that the monetary social beneﬁts induce the strongest
top-down redistribution. Second are the real public beneﬁts. In case of the taxes, the tests
show that the tax system as a whole hardly generates redistributive eﬀects. The signiﬁcant
progressivity of the income and property taxes is absorbed by the inverse redistributive
eﬀects of the other taxes, above all the regressive excise taxes. The only test results that
are contrary to the ﬁndings above are those for the social contributions. Instead of having a
leveling progressive eﬀect, social contributions show to increase income inequality.5
3.4 Redistribution across Socioeconomic Groups
The results presented so far have focused on the vertical redistribution across income groups.
This section aims to give an indication of the horizontal redistribution across socioeconomic
groups. The incidence results shown in Table 4 already have revealed the redistribution from
working to retired households. Now, for the working-age population, the following examines
to what extent the state brings about (1) redistribution between childless households and
families with children, and (2) redistribution across households with diﬀerent work loads.
5Detailed tests reveal that income-indiﬀerent health insurance premiums play a part in this ﬁnding;
however, when they are excluded, regressive eﬀects still remain in the middle and upper income groups.
More important are the comparatively high contributions of the (upper) middle class to pension funds.
These households have a greater propensity to save within occupational provision plans than do the highest
income households. As a consequence, payments to pension funds (direct and indirect ones in the form of
capital gains of the pension funds) lose their leveling eﬀect in the upper part of the income distribution.
15Table 5 presents the expenditure and revenue incidence for diﬀerent types of households.
It shows that couples without children (school age or in education) realize the highest pre-
ﬁsc income. With 96’070 francs per adult equivalent, this group lies about 20 percent above
the average pre-ﬁsc income of nearly 80’000 francs. The second highest income earners
are couples with one child as well as single-person households. With an increase in the
number of children, the pre-ﬁsc income declines, whereby the income losses are greater with
the ﬁrst and second child than with subsequent children. This ﬁnding reﬂects the frequent
withdrawal from work by mothers after the birth of the ﬁrst child or, at the latest, second
child. Consequently, households with more than one child generate below-average pre-ﬁsc
income. However, income before transfers are by far the lowest for single-parent households.
With 51’930 francs they earn about 35 percent less than average.
State transfers smooth the income distribution in favor of families with children. Al-
though childless couples still derive the highest income, their lead over the average household
falls to 8 percent. Even greater is the loss for single-person households whose post-ﬁsc in-
come is below average. In contrast, couples with more than one child slightly beneﬁt as their
income approaches the average from below. By far the most favored group is single-parent
households, however. With a post-ﬁsc income of 65’570 francs, they not only receive an above
average income, but are also the only household type that is better oﬀ in comparison to its
pre-ﬁsc situation. As observed from the right section of Table 5, the resource endowment of
single-parent households increases by 26 percent.
Interventions that lead to redistribution towards households with children can be found
in both public expenditures and revenues. On the expenditure side, the provision of free
primary education is at the fore and, to a lesser extent, secondary and vocational education.
Higher education, in contrast, often beneﬁts childless couples as well. Disability insurance,
besides supporting households without children, of which there are many in the advanced
working age group, favors single parents. Other forms of social insurance and social assistance
strongly target single parents, too. This ﬁnding comes to light particularly if the beneﬁts
are related to pre-ﬁsc income (right section of Table 5). On the public revenue side, family
households, in terms of absolute value as well as in relation to pre-ﬁsc income, bear the
lowest tax burden. The same is true for social security contributions, with the exception of
health insurance premiums. Again, single-parent households are aﬀorded the most tax relief.
Table 6 shows the expenditure and revenue incidence for working-age households with a
full-time (>90%), middle (50-90%) and small (<50%) work load, without and with school-
age children up to 16 years. One hundred percent is deﬁned as a work week with 40 hours. A
household falls into the full-time category if the average work time of all household members
above 18 – thus including possible adult children still living in the parents’ house – is at
least 36 hours. Accordingly, households in which the adults work on average 20 to 36 hours
(less than 20 hours) per week are classiﬁed in the middle (small) category.
16Table 5: Incidence of public expenditures and revenues by type of household, households in working age group, 2005
1 Adult 1 Adult Couple Couple Couple Couple Mean 1 Adult 1 Adult Couple Couple Couple Couple Mean
1+child 1child 2child. 2+child. 1+child 1child 2child. 2+child.
per adult equivalent, in CHF in % of pre-ﬁsc income
PRE-FISC INCOME 83’010 51’930 96’070 83’770 69’300 60’520 79’790 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
POST-FISC INCOME 61’660 65’570 68’690 64’670 59’420 59’140 63’650 74.3 126.3 71.5 77.2 85.7 97.7 79.8
PUBLIC SPENDING 33’360 46’340 37’730 36’010 35’480 39’190 36’870 40.2 89.2 39.3 43.0 51.2 64.8 46.2
Public goods 5’250 5’370 6’340 6’330 6’200 6’250 5’970 6.3 10.3 6.6 7.6 8.9 10.3 7.5
Education, primary 0 6’390 0 3’700 7’460 10’300 3’180 0.0 12.3 0.0 4.4 10.8 17.0 4.0
Education, secondary 1’040 4’560 920 1’570 1’770 2’150 1’500 1.2 8.8 1.0 1.9 2.6 3.5 1.9
Education, tertiary 1’830 2’380 1’270 1’210 1’090 570 1’410 2.2 4.6 1.3 1.4 1.6 0.9 1.8
Culture 930 780 1’000 940 800 720 890 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1
Health 2’110 2’710 3’000 2’940 3’020 3’110 2’800 2.5 5.2 3.1 3.5 4.4 5.1 3.5
Transport 3’530 2’460 3’460 3’050 2’410 2’320 3’060 4.2 4.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.8
Subsidies 760 750 1’080 1’290 1’260 2’900 1’220 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.8 4.8 1.5
Old-age ins. (AHV)/ pension plans 3’210 610 6’820 1’410 200 40 2’990 3.9 1.2 7.1 1.7 0.3 0.1 3.8
Disability insurance (IV) beneﬁts 4’700 5’990 3’430 1’420 1’000 810 3’120 5.7 11.5 3.6 1.7 1.4 1.3 3.9
Health insurance beneﬁts 2’780 3’010 3’650 3’570 3’260 3’020 3’270 3.3 5.8 3.8 4.3 4.7 5.0 4.1
Other social insurance beneﬁts 4’530 5’420 3’970 5’370 4’560 4’890 4’590 5.5 10.4 4.1 6.4 6.6 8.1 5.8
Social assistance 1’850 4’650 1’640 1’900 1’120 620 1’710 2.2 9.0 1.7 2.3 1.6 1.0 2.1
Debt service 1’350 1’880 1’530 1’460 1’440 1’590 1’500 1.6 3.6 1.6 1.7 2.1 2.6 1.9
in % of pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts (real & monetary)
PUBLIC REVENUES 54’710 32’690 65’120 55’100 45’360 40’570 53’020 47.0 33.3 48.7 46.0 43.3 40.7 45.4
Income and property taxes 10’610 4’730 12’950 9’870 6’910 5’880 9’620 9.1 4.8 9.7 8.2 6.6 5.9 8.2
Earnings and capital taxes 2’310 1’420 2’460 1’820 1’520 1’270 1’990 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.7
Excise duties 6’030 4’540 6’080 5’070 4’360 3’850 5’290 5.2 4.6 4.5 4.2 4.2 3.9 4.5
Other taxes 2’790 1’810 2’910 2’330 2’010 1’670 2’450 2.4 1.8 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.7 2.1
Remunerations 4’470 4’570 5’400 5’390 5’280 5’330 5’090 3.8 4.7 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.3 4.4
Public investments 2’740 1’780 3’110 2’560 2’100 1’880 2’550 2.4 1.8 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.2
Contributions to AHV and IV 6’690 3’430 8’140 6’970 5’830 5’230 6’600 5.7 3.5 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.2 5.7
Contributions to pension plans 8’690 3’990 11’030 9’490 7’640 7’040 8’730 7.5 4.1 8.2 7.9 7.3 7.1 7.5
Contributions to health insurance 2’470 2’420 3’330 3’200 2’830 2’490 2’890 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5
Contrib. to other social insurance 3’670 1’990 4’330 3’760 3’130 2’490 3’550 3.2 2.0 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.5 3.0
Capital income of social insurance 4’250 2’010 5’380 4’640 3’750 3’440 4’270 3.7 2.0 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.7
Note: The allocation of public expenditures and revenues to households corresponds to the incidence assumptions of the standard scenario deﬁned in Section ?? and Table 2.
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7For childless households, pre-ﬁsc income rises with the number of work hours. In contrast,
for households with children, pre-ﬁsc income hardly diﬀers between those with full-time
and middle work hours; only households working less than 50 percent clearly earn less.
This ﬁnding indicates that there are low market income and relatively big families among
households with long work hours. As the sizeable inﬂow of subsidies into the ‘>90%, w.
child’ category shows, this trend is driven partly by farming households.
With respect to diﬀerent work loads in the labor market as well, the analysis shows that
public transfers smooth income considerably. The beneﬁciaries are the households with short
or missing working hours. While full-time employed households, irrespective of the presence
of children, arrive at a post-ﬁsc income that is up to 7 percent higher than that of households
with a middle work load, both categories fall short of the income attained by households
with the fewest work hours.
Partly and early retired households clearly play a role in this somewhat surprising result,
as indicated by the large beneﬁts from pension plans to the ‘<50%’ category. On the other
hand, households with short work hours, with and without children, are the main recipients
of the beneﬁts of the health, disability, unemployment, and accident insurance sectors, as well
as social assistance. Moreover, households with few work hours receive the most educational
services. This circumstance is brought about mainly by households with adult children in
secondary and tertiary full-time education and less by single (parent) households whose
members are working while completing their education. On the contribution side, it is
noteworthy that both income and property taxes and social contributions hardly diﬀer among
households with long and middle work loads, and are clearly lower only for households with
a small work load.
To summarize, the vertical redistribution of resources across income categories is ac-
companied by the horizontal redistribution across socioeconomic groups. Within a year,
considerable means ﬂow from childless households to families with children. Households
with middle to long work hours support households with little or no participation in the
labor market at and before retirement age. Other horizontal redistributions across working
and nonworking households that, even if not explicitly shown, emerge from the incidence
ﬁgures occur due to disability, ill health and accident, motherhood, and unemployment. In
general, household groups that would have to manage with far below-average income without
state interventions clearly improve their economic situation thanks to the public transfers
and sometimes attain even above-average post-ﬁsc income. This situation begs the question
as to what extent risks are not only suﬃciently insured, but rather overinsured, and to what
extent this situation leads to negative work and savings incentives. This circumstance is
all the more acute because the income sacriﬁce is modest when a household switches from
full-time occupation to a mid-level work load.
18Table 6: Incidence of public expenditures and revenues by work load, households in working age group, 2005
>90% 50-90% <50% >90% 50-90% <50% Mean >90% 50-90% <50% >90% 50-90% <50% Mean
w. child w. child w. child w. child w. child w. child
per adult equivalent, in CHF in % of pre-ﬁsc income
PRE-FISC INCOME 105’740 91’800 32’320 69’500 70’400 38’180 79’790 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
POST-FISC INCOME 65’890 62’710 71’980 62’320 58’300 66’050 63’650 62.3 68.3 222.7 89.7 82.8 173.0 79.8
PUBLIC SPENDING 25’420 32’350 76’310 36’870 33’900 58’050 36’870 24.0 35.2 236.1 53.1 48.2 152.1 46.2
Public goods 6’170 5’950 4’820 6’120 6’270 5’390 5’970 5.8 6.5 14.9 8.8 8.9 14.1 7.5
Education 2’140 4’140 6’580 9’110 9’870 12’850 6’090 2.0 4.5 20.3 13.1 14.0 33.7 7.6
Culture 970 950 880 880 780 640 890 0.9 1.0 2.7 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.1
Health 2’480 2’920 2’940 2’950 2’940 3’000 2’800 2.3 3.2 9.1 4.2 4.2 7.9 3.5
Transport 3’610 3’350 2’960 2’500 2’610 1’960 3’060 3.4 3.7 9.1 3.6 3.7 5.1 3.8
Subsidies 1’570 580 400 4’790 450 300 1’220 1.5 0.6 1.2 6.9 0.6 0.8 1.5
Old-age insurance (AHV) beneﬁts 40 30 1’730 0 0 0 200 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Pension plans 560 1’660 19’910 70 90 2’460 2’790 0.5 1.8 61.6 0.1 0.1 6.5 3.5
Disability insurance (IV) beneﬁts 1’690 3’190 12’790 1’150 930 6’290 3’120 1.6 3.5 39.6 1.7 1.3 16.5 3.9
Health insurance beneﬁts 3’090 3’550 3’650 3’110 3’180 3’270 3’270 2.9 3.9 11.3 4.5 4.5 8.6 4.1
Other social insurance beneﬁts 2’090 3’730 12’020 4’210 4’510 8’990 4’590 2.0 4.1 37.2 6.1 6.4 23.6 5.8
Social assistance 160 1’320 5’960 590 990 11’190 1’710 0.2 1.4 18.4 0.8 1.4 29.3 2.1
Debt service 1’030 1’310 3’100 1’500 1’380 2’360 1’500 1.0 1.4 9.6 2.2 2.0 6.2 1.9
in % of pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts (real & monetary)
PUBLIC REVENUES 65’260 61’450 36’650 44’050 46’000 30’180 53’020 49.8 49.5 33.7 41.4 44.1 31.4 45.4
Income and property taxes 12’460 11’170 9’030 6’980 7’090 4’710 9’620 9.5 9.0 8.3 6.6 6.8 4.9 8.2
Earnings and capital taxes 2’200 2’380 2’600 1’420 1’470 1’470 1’990 1.7 1.9 2.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7
Excise duties 6’180 5’790 5’120 4’540 4’440 3’730 5’290 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.3 4.3 3.9 4.5
Other taxes 2’810 2’780 2’710 1’890 1’990 1’750 2’450 2.1 2.2 2.5 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.1
Remunerations 5’260 5’070 4’100 5’210 5’340 4’590 5’090 4.0 4.1 3.8 4.9 5.1 4.8 4.4
Public investments 3’020 2’840 2’460 2’090 2’120 1’700 2’550 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.2
Contrib. to AHV and IV 8’650 7’530 3’080 5’900 5’780 2’940 6’600 6.6 6.1 2.8 5.5 5.5 3.1 5.7
Contrib. to pension plans 11’400 11’120 2’240 6’950 8’020 3’430 8’730 8.7 9.0 2.1 6.5 7.7 3.6 7.5
Contrib. to health insurance 2’810 3’220 3’150 2’710 2’740 2’570 2’890 2.1 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.5
Contrib. to other social insurance 4’920 4’170 960 2’910 3’090 1’550 3’550 3.8 3.4 0.9 2.7 3.0 1.6 3.0
Capital income of social insurance 5’560 5’390 1’210 3’430 3’920 1’730 4’270 4.2 4.3 1.1 3.2 3.8 1.8 3.7
Note: The allocation of public expenditures and revenues to households corresponds to the incidence assumptions of the standard scenario deﬁned in Section ?? and Table 2.
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93.5 Lifetime Income Before and After Transfers
Figure 2 displays the average courses of pre- and post-ﬁsc lifetime income that result if, as
described in Section 2.3, average cohort income is generated out of available annual cross-
sectional incidence analyses and the separate incomes are strung together according to cohort
age. The pre-ﬁsc income starts out low in the younger years and then rises to a ﬁrst peak at
around age 30. Afterwards, income declines during the years when many households start a
family and the children are small, so that full-time employment often ceases. After age 40,
income ascends again until it reaches the second peak between 50 and 55. With the gradual
withdrawal from work, income then starts to decline again. Towards age 70, the decline slows
as the pre-ﬁsc income usually no longer includes earned income and is generated mainly out
of invested assets.
















Pre-fisc lifetime income  
Post-fisc lifetime income  
Note: Each part of the curve shows the average course of income per cohort as calculated in the annual analyses for 1990, 1998,
2000-05 (for detailed ﬁgures see Table 9 in the Appendix). Strung together, these parts approximate the average course of
the lifetime income before and after transfers, respectively. The dotted lines represent the smoothing of the piecewise courses.
Income is calculated in 2005 prices.
Public expenditures and revenues considerably smooth lifetime income. After the age
of about 20, when employment is increasingly taken up and income rises, post-ﬁsc income
begins to depart from pre-ﬁsc income. After age 30, a post-ﬁsc income of about 55’000 francs
is reached, a level that remains more or less constant until the age of 50. Compared to pre-
20ﬁsc income, this amount is 20’000 to 25’000 francs less, but the kink in the family years evens
out. After age 50, post-ﬁsc income, coupled with fewer family burdens and an increase in
beneﬁts that substitute for earned income (often disability or unemployment beneﬁts prior
to eﬀective old-age beneﬁts), begins to rise. Around the age of 60, post-ﬁsc income surpasses
pre-ﬁsc income. Finally, due to the higher utilization of health and care services, post-ﬁsc
income possibly increases again between ages 70 and 75.
The course of lifetime income before and after transfers shows that elderly households,
on average, receive high positive net transfers. At the same time, considerable reductions of
pre-ﬁsc income during the working years indicate that the beneﬁts in old age are generally
pre-ﬁnanced through negative net transfers. An increase in the (social security) contribution
burden during the working life breaks the income peaks of that period. In return, this increase
in contributions during the work phase helps avoid a drop in income after retirement; in fact,
quite the reverse is true. On average, post-retirement income exceeds the income realized
before the withdrawal from work.
3.6 Redistribution across Households versus Redistribution across
Stages of Life
Table 7 shows the inequality measure of the income of all households over all available years
(pooled sample) and its decomposition into the inequality between and within cohorts. The
upper part of the table shows, under the title ITotal
α , the inequality measures of pre-ﬁsc and
post-ﬁsc income as well as income after the provision of single beneﬁts and contributions
aggregates. The percentages represent the changes of ITotal
α in comparison to the pre-ﬁsc
situation. Under the titles IBetween
α and IWithin
α , the inequality measures of the individual
income aggregates are separated into inequalities between and within cohorts, respectively.
There, the percentages show which proportion of the change of ITotal
α is derived from these
two components. Additionally, for the contribution aggregates, the lower part of Table 7
shows the results of these computations, if the sum of pre-ﬁsc income and beneﬁts is used
as the reference base instead of pre-ﬁsc income alone.
The decomposition of the inequality measures of pre-ﬁsc income shows that, before trans-
fers, the general inequality in the population is induced primarily by inequalities within
cohorts. For example, in the case of α = 0, the entire income inequality of 1.056 consists
of 0.996 of income inequalities within cohorts (IWithin
α ) and only of 0.060 of inequalities
between long-term (1990 to 2005) cohort income (IBetween
α ). Given that the cohorts are
approximations of individual households, this ﬁnding indicates that pre-ﬁsc income inequal-
ities are attributable primarily to age-speciﬁc or life stage-speciﬁc income variations within
households and less to diﬀerences in long-term income across households.
21Table 7: Transfer-induced change in measured inequality within and between cohort income,
period 1990-2005




PRE-FISC INCOME 1.056 0.297 0.372
Pre-ﬁsc income + real beneﬁts 0.192 -81.8% ** 0.182 -38.6% ** 0.248 -33.4% **
Pre-ﬁsc income + social beneﬁts 0.125 -88.2% ** 0.135 -54.5% ** 0.198 -46.8% **
Pre-ﬁsc income − taxes 1.306 23.7% ** 0.416 39.9% ** 0.471 26.7% **
Pre-ﬁsc income − social contributions 0.875 -17.1% ** 0.338 13.6% ** 0.505 35.8% **
POST-FISC INCOME 0.152 -85.6% ** 0.143 -51.8% ** 0.213 -42.6% **
IBetween
α
PRE-FISC INCOME 0.060 0.048 0.041
Pre-ﬁsc income + real beneﬁts 0.031 -2.7% . 0.027 -7.1% . 0.024 -4.4% .
Pre-ﬁsc income + social beneﬁts 0.002 -5.5% 0.002 -15.5% 0.002 -10.4%
Pre-ﬁsc income − taxes 0.119 5.6% . 0.085 12.5% . 0.067 7.1% .
Pre-ﬁsc income − social contributions 0.046 -1.3% . 0.038 -3.3% . 0.033 -2.0% .
POST-FISC INCOME 0.010 -4.7% . 0.010 -12.8% . 0.011 -8.0% .
IWithin
α
PRE-FISC INCOME 0.996 0.249 0.331
Pre-ﬁsc income + real beneﬁts 0.161 -79.1% ** 0.155 -31.6% ** 0.224 -28.9% **
Pre-ﬁsc income + social beneﬁts 0.123 -82.7% ** 0.133 -39.0% ** 0.196 -36.4% **
Pre-ﬁsc income − taxes 1.187 18.1% ** 0.331 27.5% ** 0.404 19.6% **
Pre-ﬁsc income − social contributions 0.829 -15.8% ** 0.299 16.9% ** 0.472 37.7% **
POST-FISC INCOME 0.142 -80.9% ** 0.133 -39.1% ** 0.203 -34.6% **
ITotal
α
PRE-FISC INCOME + BENEFITS 0.091 0.104 0.154
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − taxes 0.095 4.5% ** 0.103 -1.7% . 0.145 -5.7% *
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − income/property taxes 0.085 -6.9% ** 0.096 -7.7% ** 0.141 -8.8% **
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − social contributions 0.110 20.4% ** 0.122 16.6% ** 0.191 24.0% **
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − social contrib. excl. health ins. 0.106 16.0% ** 0.118 13.0% ** 0.185 19.7% **
IBetween
α
PRE-FISC INCOME + BENEFITS 0.001 0.001 0.001
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − taxes 0.001 -0.4% . 0.001 -0.4% . 0.001 -0.3% .
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − income/property taxes 0.001 -0.3% * 0.001 -0.4% * 0.001 -0.3% *
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − social contributions 0.006 5.0% . 0.006 4.4% . 0.006 3.1% .
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − social contrib. excl. health ins. 0.006 5.1% . 0.006 4.2% . 0.006 3.0% .
IWithin
α
PRE-FISC INCOME + BENEFITS 0.090 0.103 0.153
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − taxes 0.094 5.0% ** 0.102 -1.3% 0.144 -5.5% *
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − incomce/property taxes 0.084 -6.6% ** 0.096 -7.3% ** 0.140 -8.5% **
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − social contributions 0.104 15.5% ** 0.116 12.2% ** 0.185 20.9% **
Pre-ﬁsc income + beneﬁts − social contrib. excl. health ins. 0.100 11.0% ** 0.112 8.8% ** 0.179 16.7% **
Note: ITotal
α shows the total inequality of diﬀerent income aggregates across all households over all available observation years
(pooled sample) by means of the generalized entropy measure. The percentages show for each income aggregate the change of
ITotal
α compared to the pre-ﬁsc income situation (upper part of the table) or the situation after beneﬁts (lower part). IBetween
α
and IWithin
α show which part of the total inequality traces back to the inequality between and within cohorts, respectively.
The percentages given under IBetween
α and IWithin
α show which proportion of the percentage change of ITotal
α is attributable
to these two components. **/*/. in the ‘Sign.’ column represent signiﬁcant changes on a 0.01/0.05/0.10 level determined in
nonparametric bootstrap tests with 1000 resamples. The aggregate ‘real beneﬁts’ includes all the expenditure-side positions of
the state budget (see Table 1), except for the beneﬁts of social insurance and the other social welfare institutions. These two
positions are subsumed in the ‘social beneﬁts’ aggregate. ‘Taxes’ include all revenue-side positions of the state budget, except
for social security contributions and capital and other revenues of social insurance. These positions are pooled in the ‘social
contributions’ aggregate.
22The public transfer system tends to further reduce the diﬀerences between long-term
cohort income. This scenario follows from the IBetween
α of the post-ﬁsc income distribution,
which, for all values of α, is smaller than the IBetween
α of the pre-ﬁsc situation. Much more
relevant, however, is the strong and highly signiﬁcant decrease in the inequality within the
cohorts. In the case of α = 0, the entire decline of ITotal
α of 85.6 percent is 80.9 percentage
points caused by the decline of IWithin
α , and only 4.7 percentage points caused by the decline of
IBetween
α . For α = 1 and α = 2, the dominance of the reduction of IWithin
α is less pronounced,
but still very clear. These results provide strong evidence that, in the long run, public
interventions ﬁrst smooth individual lifetime income and only in the second instance level
out income diﬀerences across households.
The breakdown into individual interventions shows that real public services and goods
induce a certain convergence of long-term income across households, but signiﬁcantly smooth
income over time. The monetary social beneﬁts, in the long run, have no leveling eﬀect at
all across households; however, they provoke even more signiﬁcant intra-household income
shifts across the life course. Taxes, in their entirety, do not have a noticeable eﬀect on
inter-household income diﬀerences, if they are related to the broader reference base of pre-
ﬁsc income and beneﬁts (shown in the lower part of Table 7). However, taxes intensify the
income ﬂuctuations in the life course for low-income households and smooth the lifetime
income only for upper-income households. Hence, the eﬀects of income and property taxes,
which smooth the lifetime income over the whole income spectrum, are oﬀset.
Social security contributions are the only transfer category that tends to enhance the
diﬀerences between cohorts and across long-term household income. In the case of α = 0,
for instance, social contributions increase the inequality of the combined pre-ﬁsc and beneﬁt
income by 20.4 percent (lower part of Table 7). With the (weakly signiﬁcant) 5.0 percentage
points, the rise in IBetween
α contributes a fourth to this increase. This ﬁnding becomes more
substantive if health insurance premiums are omitted. In fact, the cause of the greater inter-
household diﬀerences is more likely found in the strong alignment of other social security
contributions with earned income. As a consequence, funding social insurance tends to bur-
den low-income households relatively more than high-income households, because household
income consists less of capital income, which is mainly exempted from contributions.
To summarize, the state, through its interventions, brings about a social balance across
households with diﬀerent long-term income potential. More eﬀective, however, is the state’s
contribution to the smoothing of individual income ﬂuctuations across life stages and its
guarantee of a certain living standard in all life situations. Therefore, of primary impor-
tance is maintaining income after old-age withdrawal from work, but also during temporary,
labor market-, health-, or family-related limitations of earning capacity. This focus on the
insurance function comes to the fore particularly in a social security system in which social
balance is of secondary importance.
234 Discussion
4.1 Cross-Comparison with Previous Evidence
The ﬁrst assessments of public redistribution by means of budget incidence analysis date
from the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977, for the United States,
Meerman, 1979, for Malaysia, Gillespie, 1980, for Canada, Le Grand, 1982, for the
United Kingdom). Focussing on the annual redistribution, the general conclusion is that
the state substantially redistributes income, whereby the combined redistributive eﬀects of
public expenditures exceed those of public revenues. More recent studies (see Boadway
and Keen, 2000) as well as the present paper conﬁrm this ﬁnding.
Based on tax data for 1980, the as yet sole budget incidence study for Switzerland,
conducted by Leu et al. (1988), appeared.6 Consistent with the results of this study, Leu et
al. conclude that the state redistributes primarily through spending on social welfare. On
the public revenue side, although they found a slight leveling eﬀect of the whole contribution
system, Leu et al. located progressive eﬀects mainly from income and property taxes and
identiﬁed indirect taxes as neutral to regressive.
The neutrality of the contribution system in today’s results is in line with developments
over the past 25 years. First, the introduction of the value-added tax led to a shift to in-
direct, consumption-based taxes, which burden low-income households relatively more than
high-income households. Second, social security contributions rose with the general enact-
ment of the occupational pension system and increased the contribution burden of those
households whose income consists primarily of earned income and less of noncontributory
capital income. Moreover, through the possibility of above-compulsory contributions, the
introduction of the occupational pension system opened tax saving opportunities for the
middle and upper income groups. Incidence studies in the international literature report
similar developments, and mostly conclude that the tax incidence is roughly proportional to
income (for an overview, see Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002).
Empirical evidence concerning the state’s redistributive impact over a whole life cycle
is still rare, but compatible with the present paper. An early attempt to estimate lifetime
tax incidence was made by Davies et al. (1984) for Canada. They found that both the
progressivity of direct income taxes and the regressivity of other taxes diminished in a
life income perspective. As a consequence, the entire tax system, also in the long-term
view, does not entail a leveling eﬀect across households. Fullerton and Metcalf (2002)
reconﬁrmed this ﬁnding for the United States. Nelissen (1998) shows for the Netherlands
that the signiﬁcance of inter-household redistribution induced by the social security system
fades when calculated for a life cycle instead of single years.
6Hauser et al. (1994) provided a limited actualization in the 1990s as they recalculated the results from
Leu et al. for four income examples for middle-class households.
24Björklund and Palme (2002), ﬁnally, seem to have delivered the only redistribution
analysis so far that decomposes total redistribution into inter- and intra-household compo-
nents. They used panel data to analyze the redistributive impacts of Swedish social security
beneﬁts and income taxes. In accordance with this study, they conclude that the social ben-
eﬁts ﬁrst smooth individual lifetime income and only secondarily level out inter-household
income diﬀerences. In addition, deviating from this analysis, they found that income taxes
bring about a signiﬁcant inter-household redistribution as well.
4.2 Limitations of the Analysis
Although the present paper ﬁts well into the existing literature, careful interpretation war-
rants the consideration of several constraints. First, like all incidence analyses, this study
is restricted to the redistributive eﬀects of interventions that have an impact on the na-
tional budget. Redistributive eﬀects that follow from other state activities, such as price
regulations or monetary policies, are not captured (Ruggeri, 2003). Excluded as well is in-
tergenerational redistribution, which is provoked by budget deﬁcits or unsustainable funding
and payout schemes in old-age provisions.
The second limitation is that the constructed pre-ﬁsc income does not adjust for behav-
ioral aspects of households in reaction to changes in public action. This factor gives rise
to downward or upward biases in the estimates of the distributional impacts, depending on
whether the absence of the state would induce more or less private income generation. In
addition, the allocation of nonmonetary beneﬁts and indirect contributions to households in
most cases must be carried out on the basis of rather rough criteria. Whereas the use of
alternative scenarios allows for the inclusion of further incidence assumptions, this study can
only approximate the beneﬁts and burdens for individual households. At least, sensitivity
analyses show that the results are robust for a wide range of incidence assumptions.
Third, particularly when drawing political conclusions, it must be taken into account that
budget incidence studies calculate average and not marginal redistributive eﬀects. Therefore,
they often give only indications as to which impacts accrue when a certain public intervention
is further promoted or withdrawn (van de Walle, 1996). In addition, budget incidence
analysis ignores second-round eﬀects (Ruggeri, 2003). For example, even though low-
income households are not the main beneﬁciaries of the spending for tertiary education,
they can beneﬁt indirectly if the improved qualiﬁcations of the working population positively
aﬀect the general economic development.
Fourth, incidence analysis incorporates public expenditures that yield beneﬁts only in
later years, such as the realization of large transportation infrastructure projects. In this
case, the allocation of the expenditures happens at the wrong time, distorting the eﬀective
beneﬁts of households upwards (Aaron and McGuire, 1970). Similarly, the actual beneﬁts
25of infrastructure facilities are underestimated if they were constructed in the past. As a
consequence, the explanatory power of budget incidence analysis is generally better for those
public services that are generated for the most part through running expenses so that the
yearly costs and beneﬁts are closer together. Such services include education and health.
Finally, budget incidence studies are limited to the level of the purchasing power and do
not conduct a beneﬁt analysis in a welfare-theoretical sense. For example, they assume that
the value of a public service for a household can be identiﬁed adequately by its provision
costs. Clearly, the beneﬁt that a household eﬀectively derives can deviate from these costs
(van de Walle, 1996).
5 Summary and Conclusion
This paper examines the state-induced redistribution of income in Switzerland using the in-
strument of budget incidence analysis. It studies redistribution in relation to annual house-
hold income as well as from a long-term perspective in relation to lifetime income. The
results can be summarized as follows:
1. The state, together with social security institutions, has a substantial redistributive
impact. As a consequence, income diﬀerences in the population are strongly reduced.
2. In contrast to the annual perspective, however, a long-term view shows that the leveling
of income is not caused primarily by the balance across households, but by the state-
prescribed income transfers across diﬀerent stages of life within households to smooth
their lifetime income.
3. As evident from the average course of lifetime income pre- and post-transfers, the
increased contribution burden during the work stages of life levels out income peaks.
In return, this situation prevents income drops in times of limited or missing earning
capacity, especially in old age.
4. The redistributive eﬀects arise mainly from public expenditures. Within a year, both
monetary social beneﬁts and, to a lesser extent, real services and goods bolster low
income. From a long-term perspective, household-internal income smoothing over the
life cycle has the largest impact, but the real beneﬁts still have a small leveling eﬀect
across households.
5. The tax system in its entirety, neither from the short- nor long-term view, brings about
redistribution across households. Although income and property taxes are progressive,
they are neutralized by the opposite eﬀects of other taxes. In the long run, taxes,
above all for well-oﬀ households, contribute to the smoothing of lifetime income.
266. Social security contributions have a regressive eﬀect from an annual as well as long-term
perspective and tend to increase inter-household inequalities. The reason lies with the
strong alignment of social contributions with earned income, which disproportionately
charges households that have little noncontributory capital income.
7. The vertical redistribution across income groups is accompanied by horizontal resource
transfers from working to retired households, childless households to families, and
working-age individuals with a high work load to those with a smaller one.
Today, public debate on redistribution is often polarized. Whereas one side deplores
the “desolidarization” and the dismantling of the welfare system, the other complains of
the rampant growth of the social state. Neither of these views adequately reﬂects today’s
situation. An objective analysis shows that household income is insured against the expected
and unexpected vicissitudes of life. At the same time, most of the beneﬁciaries receive
support and services that they had paid for earlier on in life. Hence, the beneﬁts are for
the most part rendered and claimed by the whole population. Beyond that, as part of social
equalization, households with poor income prospects receive resources they have not pre-
funded themselves. Despite the often diﬀering rhetoric, these transfers have good target
accuracy and generally reach the lowest-income households.
Contributions to state and social insurance institutions, costing 54 percent of the eco-
nomic output, have undoubtedly reached an unprecedented dimension. Unsurpassed as well,
however, is the level of public goods and services provided to individual citizens. It may be
that the immediate contribution burden is more perceptible than the beneﬁts, which often
come as real goods taken for granted or old-age entitlements that are remunerative only in
the future. However, if the extent of the eﬀective and potential beneﬁts is taken into con-
sideration, the high contributions can well be interpreted as the price for a high equivalent
or the premium for a high insurance sum. Therefore, if the contribution burden is judged as
too high, then the publicly guaranteed living standard has to be questioned as well.
This chapter shows that the average income of retired households regularly exceeds the
income of working ones. This issue raises the question as to whether the state induces an
overinsurance of income risks. Even if contributions and beneﬁts largely even out in the long
run, this outcome is accompanied by a limited freedom of households to deﬁne their lifetime
income course. From such a point of view, an expansion of the welfare state is less a question
of redistributing income by favoring certain household categories and burdening others, but
a question of increasingly inhibiting households in their autonomy of decision-making.
27A Appendix
A.1 Incidence Assumptions
a) Revenue incidence assumptions
With regard to tax incidence, the general consensus for personal income and property taxes
is that no shifting takes place and the formal tax debtor is also the eﬀective taxpayer.
Therefore, public revenues from these taxes are distributed among households according to
their income and property taxes paid.
No such consensus exists for corporate taxes, however. One literature camp considers
the capital owners as the payers of these taxes, because companies distribute proﬁts only
after taxes. The other camp attributes the tax burden to the consumers because companies
can roll oﬀ their taxes by raising product prices. This analysis takes a middle position
and allocates half of the earnings and capital taxes on capital owners (approximated by
the capital income of the households) and half on consumers. For real estate taxes, where
a similar disagreement exists, the same approach applies: 50 percent of the tax burden is
allocated to the real estate owners according to their real estate taxes paid, and 50 percent
to the tenants according to their rent expenses. In the progressive scenario, the corporate
and real estate taxes shift entirely to the capital and real estate owners, respectively. In the
regressive case, the consumers fully bear the corporate taxes.
The standard assumption with regard to excise duties is that they are shifted to con-
sumers via higher prices. Accordingly, value-added taxes, fuel taxes, taxes on tobacco prod-
ucts, as well as vehicle taxes, customs duties, royalties and concessions are distributed in
proportion to the (speciﬁc) consumption expenditures of the households. However, the pro-
gressive scenario allows for price increases to regularly induce wage adjustments and social
transfers so that the excise duties should be assigned to household income instead.
For remunerations, two positions are considered as well. One reﬂects the view that
remunerations compensate the state for providing its services and are therefore borne equally
by the individuals in each household. The other position implies that the well-oﬀ populace
more frequently makes use of chargeable services and also is more likely to buy more expensive
services (e.g., in the old-age and nursing home sector which fees constitute an important part
of the remunerations). Again, the standard scenario adopted in this analysis represents the
middle ground and allocates remunerations one half each according to the size and income
of the households. The alternative scenarios adopt the extreme positions.
Social security fees are attributed entirely to the insurants proportional to their contri-
butions. This arrangement reﬂects the common understanding that the employers’ contri-
butions are an implicit part of salaries. The capital revenues of the social insurance system,
which are accumulated mostly by the occupational beneﬁt institutions, are thought of as
indirect contributions and therefore are distributed among households according to paid
28contributions as well. This arrangement reﬂects the opinion that, in the absence of pension
plans, capital gains would be garnered privately and could be used at liberty. Similarly, the
public ﬁnancial and investment income is charged according to taxes paid, because, in the
end, the necessary funds must be procured by the taxpayer.
b) Expenditure incidence assumptions
On the side of public expenditures, a distinction must ﬁrst be made between public goods in
the economic sense and goods or services that are publicly provided but privately used. The
former includes, for example, the general administration, national security, or involvement
in international aﬀairs. The allocation of expenses for these typically generally accessible,
nonrivaling goods is not evident. Incidence analysis often employs the concept of allocation
per capita, which is based on the conventional assumption of the collective goods theory
whereby everybody beneﬁts equally from public goods. Apart from this, public goods are
also assigned according to household income, thereby assuming that they beneﬁt those who
participate in economic production and rely on a functioning business context. The standard
scenario apportions the public goods one half each according to household size and income,
whereas the progressive and regressive variants again take the extreme positions.
For privately consumed public services, identiﬁcation of the beneﬁciaries is easier. In the
case of public transport services, road facilities, or subsidized cultural institutions, private
outlays are necessary in order to beneﬁt from the state-provided goods. The allocation of
these services can then be oriented towards speciﬁc household expenses. Other services do
not require a cost participation, but the recipients of the beneﬁts are identiﬁable. This
scenario applies directly to the education sector where public expenditures can be assigned
according to the number of students per household. In the case of the health sector, the
costs are allocable according to the age-gender proﬁles of the household, because these proﬁles
determine the utilization of health care services.
The allocation of monetary beneﬁts rests upon the hypothesis that the recipient of a pay-
ment equals the eﬀective beneﬁciary. Social insurance and social assistance are thus assigned
proportionally to the transfers received. For agricultural subsidies, it is assumed that they, in
the form of direct payments or production grants, stay with the farmers. Accordingly, their
allocation is based on farming income. The remaining subsidies are distributed according to
household consumption expenditures, assuming that they lead to price reductions.
Finally, the expenses required to serve the national debt, in the standard scenario, are
apportioned to households according to the public expenditures assigned to the households
up to that point. This arrangement reﬂects the view that the public debt favors mainly
those who also receive the most beneﬁts from the state. Departing from this arrangement,
the regressive scenario takes the position that debt service beneﬁts the owners of government
securities and thus allocates the debt interests according to capital income.
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Table 8: Transfer-induced change in measured inequality, 2005
Iα=0 ∆ Sign. Iα=1 ∆ Sign. Iα=2 ∆ Sign.
PRE-FISC INCOME 0.765 0.306 0.364
Pre-ﬁsc income + real beneﬁts 0.202 -74% ** 0.185 -40% ** 0.232 -36% **
Pre-ﬁsc income + social beneﬁts 0.109 -86% ** 0.118 -61% ** 0.164 -55% **
Pre-ﬁsc income − taxes 1.439 88% ** 0.433 42% ** 0.423 16%
Pre-ﬁsc income − social contributions 0.865 13% * 0.345 13% ** 0.471 30% **
Post-ﬁsc income 0.107 -86% ** 0.100 -67% ** 0.128 -65% **
PRE-FISC INC. + BENEFITS 0.079 0.088 0.121
Pre-ﬁsc inc. +benef. − taxes 0.080 2% 0.082 -7% 0.101 -16% .
Pre-ﬁsc inc. +benef. − income/property taxes 0.069 -12% ** 0.076 -14% ** 0.096 -21% **
Pre-ﬁsc inc. +benef. − social contributions 0.086 9% ** 0.097 10% ** 0.141 16% **
Pre-ﬁsc inc. +benef. − social contrib. excl. health ins. 0.081 3% 0.092 4% ** 0.133 10% **
Note: This table shows diﬀerent general entropy measures for the distribution of the main income aggregates. α = 0 reﬂects
the highest sensitivity to inequalities in the low-income households. The ‘∆’ column in the upper part of the table shows the
change in the inequality measure compared to the income situation before any transfer. The lower part of the table presents the
change in the inequality measure in comparison to the income situation after the positive, but before the negative, transfers.
**/*/. in the ‘Sign.’ column represent signiﬁcant changes on a 0.01/0.05/0.10 level determined in nonparametric bootstrap
tests with 1000 resamples. The aggregate ‘real beneﬁts’ includes all the expenditure-side positions of the state budget (see Table
1), except for the beneﬁts of social insurance and the other social welfare institutions. These two positions are subsumed in the
‘social beneﬁts’ aggregate. ‘Taxes’ include all revenue-side positions of the state budget, except for social security contributions
and capital and other revenues of social insurance. These positions are pooled in the ‘social contributions’ aggregate.
30Table 9: Pseudo panel of pre- and post-ﬁsc income, 1990-2005
Age group Cohort 1990 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
-1934 C1 Average age 67.2 71.8 73.3 74.1 74.9 75.5 76.2 76.9
Pre-ﬁsc income 38’120 25’480 21’390 21’800 18’050 18’660 18’550 19’190
Post-ﬁsc income 72’500 94’140 86’840 84’580 72’790 76’030 76’590 76’730
No. of observations 3047 1428 517 576 508 443 380 324
1935-39 C2 Average age 53.0 61.0 63.1 63.9 64.9 65.9 67.1 67.9
Pre-ﬁsc income 78’830 69’280 52’730 44’030 35’060 26’660 25’190 24’030
Post-ﬁsc income 54’940 71’450 74’990 76’770 74’470 74’320 75’550 73’760
No. of observations 834 537 241 253 265 229 204 196
1940-44 C3 Average age 47.9 56.0 57.9 58.9 59.9 60.9 61.7 63.0
Pre-ﬁsc income 80’330 89’040 82’990 79’010 76’380 68’030 55’060 51’090
Post-ﬁsc income 55’330 61’230 59’100 65’090 67’630 67’280 67’110 69’750
No. of observations 1103 690 298 305 287 307 234 260
1945-49 C4 Average age 43.0 51.0 52.9 53.9 54.9 55.8 57.0 58.2
Pre-ﬁsc income 74’350 83’640 89’030 92’820 87’690 86’430 91’240 87’020
Post-ﬁsc income 52’410 60’800 59’680 62’450 67’900 62’340 61’920 66’740
No. of observations 1331 858 332 352 350 340 299 270
1950-54 C5 Average age 38.0 46.0 48.0 48.8 50.1 51.0 51.9 53.0
Pre-ﬁsc income 72’350 77’200 85’120 88’190 85’230 86’860 80’630 86’500
Post-ﬁsc income 49’160 57’910 58’940 58’990 62’930 64’040 64’270 61’420
No. of observations 1395 886 384 379 363 364 340 247
1955-59 C6 Average age 33.1 40.9 43.0 43.9 45.0 45.9 46.8 47.9
Pre-ﬁsc income 69’740 72’720 77’120 78’010 83’820 75’530 76’600 82’020
Post-ﬁsc income 45’950 54’770 56’140 56’180 62’120 61’650 58’350 68’620
No. of observations 1482 1157 433 456 448 377 381 334
1960-64 C7 Average age 28.0 36.0 38.0 38.9 40.0 41.0 41.9 42.9
Pre-ﬁsc income 72’800 73’220 76’920 75’370 78’670 76’420 74’710 81’220
Post-ﬁsc income 48’830 52’390 52’440 54’410 61’900 61’050 59’260 62’860
No. of observations 1416 1308 480 486 510 477 400 372
1965-69 C8 Average age 23.7 31.1 33.1 34.0 35.0 36.3 37.0 38.1
Pre-ﬁsc income 62’970 74’960 80’080 77’400 80’340 79’910 74’180 80’700
Post-ﬁsc income 48’610 53’330 57’570 54’820 59’880 62’890 57’020 62’810
No. of observations 635 1188 469 444 486 447 408 411
1970-74 C9 Average age 19.5 26.3 28.4 29.3 30.1 31.3 32.2 33.3
Pre-ﬁsc income 37570 71’830 73’860 79’700 84’800 81’010 85’650 84’790
Post-ﬁsc income 41500 53’470 55’720 56’260 61’400 61’760 60’210 62’560
No. of observations 23 780 301 291 292 279 290 289
Note: The table shows the pseudo panel for nine age group cohorts generated out of the budget incidence analyses from 1990,
1998, and 2000 to 2005. For each observational year and for each cohort, it shows the average age as well as the average pre-
and post-ﬁsc income. Income is calculated in prices of the year 2005. The income development between 1990 and 2005 within
a single cohort represents the income development of an individual household of the same period.
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